Statutes - Presumptions as to Enactment - Entrinsic Evidence Admitted to Defeat an Enrolled Bill by Boardman, Richard
North Dakota Law Review 
Volume 40 Number 1 Article 6 
1964 
Statutes - Presumptions as to Enactment - Entrinsic Evidence 
Admitted to Defeat an Enrolled Bill 
Richard Boardman 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Boardman, Richard (1964) "Statutes - Presumptions as to Enactment - Entrinsic Evidence Admitted to 
Defeat an Enrolled Bill," North Dakota Law Review: Vol. 40 : No. 1 , Article 6. 
Available at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr/vol40/iss1/6 
This Case Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UND Scholarly Commons. 
It has been accepted for inclusion in North Dakota Law Review by an authorized editor of UND Scholarly Commons. 
For more information, please contact und.commons@library.und.edu. 
RECENT CASES
S T A T U T E S - PRESUMPTIONS AS TO ENACTMENT -
EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE ADMITTED T o DEFEAT A N ENROLLED
BILL - Relators were indicted for violating the Sunday
closing law, as amended by the 1963 session of the West
Virginia General Assembly They brought an original pro-
ceeding in prohibition to restrain their prosecutioi, alleging
the unconstitutionality of the act on the ground that it had
been passed by the House of Delegates after the expiration
of the sixty-day session by mandatory provision of the state
constitution. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia
held that the journal of the House was sufficiently ambiguous
on its face to warrant the introduction of extrinsic evidence
to show that the House had "stopped the clock" and had
passed the act in question after the constitutional limit of the
regular session had expired. State ex rel. Heck's Discount
Centers v Winters, 132 S.E.2d 374 (West Virginia 1963)
From the earliest times the enrolled bill has held the
position of being the documentary basis of statutory law,
and courts have been circumspect in questioning its legiti-
macy In England an Act of Parliament speaks conclusive
fact, binding upon the judiciary' Some American courts
follow the common law lead to hold the parchment as final
proof of regular enactment; not even the legislative journals
may defeat the act. 2  The policy behind this strict rule is
that courts should not discredit the workings of a branch
equal in power to their own. 3  When other courts look behind
the enrolled bill, they go no further than taking judicial notice
of the journals, and then only if it affirmatively appears that
the constitutional requirements have not been met. 4  Many
jurisdictions give the act a prLma facie presumption of validity
but admit the journals in evidence to defeat it when the
1. Richards v. McBride, 8 Q.B.D. 119 (1881).
2. State ex rel. Cline v. Shriker, 228 Ind. 41, 88 N.E.2d 746 (1950) Jackson
v. Walker, 121 Tex. 303, 49 S.W.2d 693 (1932) State v. Martin, 38 Wash. 2d
834, 232 P.2d 832 (1951).
3. Roehl v. Public Util. Dist. No. 1 of Chelan County, 42 Wash. 2d 214, 261
P.2d 92 (1953), in which the "enrolled bill" rule is exhaustively examined and
reaffirmed.
4. Young v. Galloway, 177 Ore. 617, 164 P.2d 427 (1945) Fuqua v. David-
son County, 189 Tenn. 645, 227 S.W.2d 12 (1950).
RECENT CASES
regularity of its passage has been put in issue. 5 And where
the fundamental law demands that the journal show the
conditions of enactment, the failure to record these essentials
is a bar to enforcement. 6  The rationale of this equally
strict but opposite rule is that the judiciary lacks legislative
power and may not recognize laws improperly enacted.
7
One of these constitutional mandates found in seventeen
states is that the bill must be passed within the time limit of
the session;8 for when it runs out, the body becomes functus
officio and its acts are in theory without effect.9  It is a
common practice, however, for legislatures to stop the clock
on the last day of the session and not to start it again until
business is finished. When this happens, neither the enrolled
bill nor the journal shows the stoppage nor reveals whether
the body has exceeded its authority And since the almost
universal rule formerly excluded parol evidence to impeach
the enrolled bill, 10 the constitutional limitation rested for its
effectiveness upon the good behavior of the legislature itself.1
But in the principal case the West Virginia Court admitted
affidavits from the Clerk and Members of the House to
determine that the act in question was not regularly passed.
It justified this extraordinary departure by examining the
impossibility of discovering the exact time of adjournment
from the ambiguous and conflicting statements in the
journal,' 2 and the illogic of enforcing a bill which never
became law
5. People ex rel. Manville v. Leddy, 53 Colo. 109, 123 Pac. 824 (1912),
Ridgely v. Mayor, etc., of Baltimore, 119 Md. 567, 87 Atil. 909 (1913) State V.
Adams, 323 Mo. 729, 19 S.W.2d 671 (1929) Barnsdall Ref. Corp. v. Welsh, 64
S.D. 647, 269 N.W 853 (1936).
6. McClellan v. Stein, 229 Mich. 203, 201 N.W 209 (1924) Intergration of
Bar Case, 244 Wis. 8, 11 N.W.2d 604 (1943), in which all phases of this rule
are examined.
7. People v. Leddy, supra, note 5.
8. CAL. CONST. art. 4 § 2 DEL. CONST. art 2 § 4 FLA. CONST. art. 3 § 2
GA. CONST. art. 2 § 1603 HAWAII ORO. ACT. § 43 MD. CONST. art. III § 15
MINN. CONST. art 4 § 1 MO. CONST. art. III § 20a, MONT. CONST. art V § 6
N. M. CONST. art. IV § 5, N. D. CONST. art. 56, TEx. CONST. art. 3 § 5 UTAH
CONST. art. VI § 16 VA CONST. art. 46 WASH. CONST. art. 2 § 12, W VA.
CONST. art. VI § 22, Wyo. CONST. art. 3 § 6.
9. See State ex rel. Cunningham v. Davis, 123 Fla. 121, 166 So. 289 (1936),
and State ex rel. Landis v. Thompson, 121 Fla. 561, 164 So. 192 (1935) for a
discussion of the evidentiary value of the records of a "rump" session.
10. See, e.g., People v. Leddy, supra, note 5, and Ridgely v. Mayor, etc.. of
Baltimore, supra, note 5. Contra, Franklin Nat. Bank of Long Island v. Clark,
26 Misc. 2d 724, 212 N.Y.S.2d 942 (1961).
11. But cf. White v. Hinton, 3 Wyo. 753, 30 Pac. 953 (1892), "If on rare
occasions validity should be given to legislation not strictly regular in its enact-
ment, the evil would be less than the unsettling of the evidentiary foundation
of all statutory law."
12. The ambiguity was part of a concerted effort by the opponents of the bill.
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An early Dakota case held the same way 13 But more
recent analogous decisions indicate a shift toward the pre-
sumption of validity unless the contrary affirmatively appears
in the journals.1
4
The practice and problem of stopping the clock would
vanish without the limit on the length of sessions. As the
volume of business grows with every year, there remains
little reason to deny the legislature the full time to perform
its duties which the executive and judicial branches have
always had.' 5
RICHARD BOARDMAN
EMINENT DOMAIN - REGULATIONS R E L A T I N G T O
HIGHWAYS AND STREETS - COMPENSATION F 0 R L o s s 0 F
ACCESS - In a condemnation proceeding by the New Mexico
Highway Commission the District Court entered a judgment
which compensated an abutting property owner for the
depreciation in market value of undeveloped property caused
by the loss of direct access to a highway, which was the
result of being placed upon a frontage road of a limited access
highway On appeal, the State Supreme Court held, one
justice dissenting, that owners of land abutting a highway
did not sustain a compensable loss by action of the State in
removing their direct access and in providing a frontage road.
State v Danfelser, 348 P.2d 241 (N.M. 1963)
As early as the second half of the 19th century, New York
decisions clearly established a compensable interest in the
right of access of abutting property owners.' It is now
generally recognized that abutting owners have a right of
access to and from public roads which may not be cut off or
interferred with unless justly compensated for 2
13. Treadway v Schnauber, 1 Dak. 227, 46 N.W 464 (1875).
14. State ex rel. Sorlie v. Steen, 55 N.D. 239, 212 N.W 843 (1927) State v.
Schultz, 44 N.D. 269, 174 N.W 81 (1919) Woolfolk v. Albrecht, 22 N.D. 36, 133
N.W 310 (1911) Power v. Kitching, 10 N.D. 254, 86 N.W 737 (1901).
15. Orfield, Improving State Legislative Procedure and Processes, 31 MINN.
L. R v. 161 (1946). See also Lloyd, Judicial Control of Legislative Procedure,
4 SYRACUSE L. REV. 6 (1952).
1. Kane v. Metropolitan El. Ry. Co., 125 N.Y. 164, 26 N.E. 278 (1891)
Lohr v. Metropolitan El. Ry. Co., 104 N.Y. 268, 10 N.E. 528 (1887) State v.
New York El. R.R., 90 N.Y. 122 (1882).
2. E.g., People v. Lipari, 28 Cal. Rptr. 808 (1963) State v. Ensley, 240 Ind.
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